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The Discrimination Shibboleth
ANDREW KULL*
Discrimination by age or disability bears little resemblance to
the invidious distinctions prohibited by the Civil Rights Act of
1964. When rules requiring compensatory treatment of certain
classes of employees are characterized as laws prohibiting "dis-
crimination," the description serves primarily to disguise the pol-
icy choices being made and the costs they impose.
The trouble with the Symposium on Forbidden Grounds' was that
we so rarely managed to get beyond the starting point of race.
Twenty professors spent most of two days discussing Richard Ep-
stein's most heterodox claims about racial discrimination in employ-
ment: precisely the arguments that a majority of the participants
were prepared to dismiss out of hand. This was a comfortable but
regrettable arrangement, because it is the subsequent chapters of the
story, considering employment discrimination on grounds other than
race, that are the more genuinely controversial.
An expanding range of employment decisions has come to be con-
demned as "discriminatory" on the strength of a civil rights analogy
that is notably deficient. That is, we now prohibit as "discrimina-
tion" a variety of practices - bearing on the employment of the
elderly and the disabled, as well as on some terms of employment for
women workers - that are qualitatively different from the kind of
"discrimination" that people agreed to prohibit in 1964. The policies
served by the new prohibitions are different from those that justify a
prohibition of old-fashioned, invidious discrimination on the basis of
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race or sex; intelligent analysis requires that the new policies be ac-
curately identified and evaluated on their own merits. A blanket
characterization of such measures as laws against "discrimination"
that vindicate the "civil rights" of protected classes tends, on the
contrary, to disguise the social and political choices being made. This
may be one of the reasons the characterization has persisted.
Forbidden Grounds contains a wealth of provocative argument on
these issues, which our Symposium discussions scarcely touched. The
book itself is largely to blame. Not content with a conservative at-
tack on the law of employment discrimination, Professor Epstein has
mounted a radical one - the terms of which oblige him to deny the
necessity of government intervention to prohibit even overt, invidious
discrimination on the basis of race. Epstein's arguments on this point
lead him where very few readers will follow. They lead him, more-
over, away from the more tactically advantageous position from
which to challenge the modern panoply of antidiscrimination laws,
which is to point out the extent to which the new regulation diverges
from the classical antidiscrimination model.
Roughly summarized, Forbidden Grounds advances the case that
the costs of employment discrimination are commonly overstated,
while the costs of employment discrimination laws are greatly under-
estimated. Professor Epstein's faith in the market economy leads him
to argue that a regime of unfettered freedom of contract would pro-
duce greater utility than does our current system of pervasive regula-
tion. With regard to much of present-day antidiscrimination law -
in which age and disability have now joined race and sex as "forbid-
den grounds" for employment decisions - many readers will find
the demonstration persuasive. Virtually all readers, by contrast, will
feel that the historic core of the civil rights statutes - the hard-won
prohibition of invidious racial discrimination in private employment
and public accommodations - was a justifiable and necessary in-
stance of government intervention to overcome discriminatory prefer-
ences that the free market, in the era of segregation, reflected only
too faithfully.
Professor Epstein's refusal to make that one critical exception is
what derailed the Symposium and what will make Forbidden
Grounds a book more notorious than read. He refuses, that is, to
admit that even overt racial discrimination in employment makes a
special case justifying legislative interference with freedom of con-
tract. This is partly a political judgment. Professor Epstein, I think it
is fair to say, would estimate both the socially acceptable level of
private racial discrimination, and the social cost of government inter-
ference with freedom of contract on this particular point, higher
than would most observers. This is defensible but visibly uncomforta-
ble ground, and Forbidden Grounds offers a variety of palliatives.
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One of these is the claim that largely preoccupied the Symposium:
that under a regime of pure freedom of contract, the incidence of
racial discrimination in private employment and public accommoda-
tions would have been relatively slight, even in the segregated South
prior to the Civil Rights Act. To deal with the historical fact of per-
sistent discrimination - not notably undermined by the economic
advantages available to nondiscriminating firms in a free market -
Epstein argues that the free market was an illusion. Discriminatory
employment practices, he asserts, were encouraged by state action
(from Jim Crow laws to the minimum wage) and by private coercion
unchecked by the state. Absent "excessive state power and the pat-
tern of private violence, intimidation, and lynching' 2 that limited the
employer's (or the innkeeper's) freedom of action, racial discrimina-
tion could not and would not have survived. Had there been genuine
freedom of contract in the segregated South, in other words, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 would not have been necessary.3 Suffice it
to say that this is a view of the history and circumstances of racial
discrimination (including circumstances within the memory of many
readers) that very few people will be willing to accept.
Reluctant to acknowledge legitimate grounds for overriding the
principle of freedom of contract even in our national history of slav-
ery and racial subjugation, Professor Epstein opposes all employment
discrimination laws, disdaining to make even what might be called
the "easy" exception for "Title VII as originally enacted." This con-
ceptual purity puts Forbidden Grounds in a peculiar straitjacket. In-
sistence that all employment discrimination laws are bad, without
exception and for essentially the same reasons (even if bad to a
greater or lesser degree), carries the paradoxical implication that
employment discrimination by race, sex, age, and disability is funda-
mentally a single phenomenon. That implication takes the argument
in precisely the wrong direction. By resisting the historical justifica-
tion for any exception to his position, even in the core case of race
discrimination in the Jim Crow era, Professor Epstein spurns the
substantial assistance offered by history to anyone who is inclined to
criticize modern-day discrimination law. The first point suggested by
the history of the subject is surely that the circumstances of slavery
and racial segregation were unique, and that laws prohibiting dis-
crimination by sex, age, or physical ability have claimed successive
places under the civil rights umbrella on the strength of an analogy
2. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 93.
3. See generally, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, 91-129.
that is progressively attenuated. An argument along these lines is
implicit in the later chapters of Forbidden Grounds - examining
employment discrimination on grounds other than race - but Pro-
fessor Epstein pursues it with one hand tied behind his back.
Within the notorious Forbidden Grounds there is another, more
conservative book: not the book Richard Epstein wrote, although he
has already written most of it. The opening of this book-within-a-
book is supplied by the reader, and it consists of a simple question.
Leaving aside the question of discrimination by race - which our
history of slavery and segregation must inevitably put in a class by
itself - why do we now prohibit other forms of discrimination in
private employment? There may be good and sufficient reasons to
forbid various kinds of discrimination on the basis of sex, age, or
physical disability, but what is most striking about the nonracial
"forbidden grounds" is how substantially they diverge from the race
discrimination paradigm.
Conceived and explained at the level of public debate, Title VII in
1964 imposed no costs; its only effect was to enjoin an injury. Be-
cause skin color is ordinarily irrelevant to job performance, and be-
cause (the point was stressed) employers remained free to use any
nonracial criteria for employment decisions, the outward burden on
employers was merely that they cease to do a gratuitous wrong.
(Thoughtful observers no doubt realized that a prohibition of dis-
crimination imposed a variety of costs on the employer and his white
employees, including the problems of a racially mixed work force
and the interference with the employer's ordinary freedom to run his
business as he liked. Given the historical and political context of ra-
cial discrimination, however, it was not thought inequitable that
costs of this order be left to lie where they fell.) The political consen-
sus of 1964 was that racial discrimination involved a distinction
without an economic difference, and that such discrimination might
appropriately be forbidden.
The most remarkable feature of our employment discrimination
law since 1964, I would suggest, is that it was so quickly extended
beyond the initial prohibition of invidious discrimination by race or
sex, where it forbade what were understood to be distinctions with-
out a difference, to encompass instances of what is (at least argua-
bly) noninvidious discrimination - thereby prohibiting distinctions
with a difference. The precise boundary between invidious and
noninvidious employment discrimination is notoriously difficult to
perceive and correspondingly controversial: this is the battleground
occupied by "disparate impact" as a test for racial discrimination,4
4. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); FORBIDDEN GROUNDS,
supra note 1, at 205-41.
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by "bona fide occupational qualifications" that distinguish between
male and female employees.5 But whatever the difficulty of charting
the outer boundaries of invidious discrimination, modern-day em-
ployment discrimination law has plainly left them behind. It is rela-
tively easy to justify a statutory requirement that employee health
benefits cover maternity-related expenses.6 It is much less obvious
that their exclusion constitutes invidious discrimination on the part
of the employer.7 When a court or a legislature determines that peri-
odic retirement income (as opposed to its annuitized value) must be
equalized for male and female employees," or that "the incremental
cost of hiring women [in this instance, because of a greater suscepti-
bility to certain work-related injuries] cannot justify discriminating
against them,"" or that employers may not impose a mandatory re-
tirement age, or that workplaces must be modified to provide reason-
able accommodation for physically disabled employees, the
lawmaker is no longer forbidding the kind of discrimination that
makes a distinction without a difference. On the contrary, the re-
quirement in each such instance is that the employer adopt a prac-
tice favoring employees in the protected class, providing what is in
effect a subsidy intended "to correct imbalances that are not created
by the employment relationship."' 0
Ethics and social policy may dictate that we devise social insur-
ance to defray the costs of maternity, or that we subsidize the jobs of
the elderly and the disabled, but the appropriateness of such choices
is at least less self-evident than the fairness of prohibiting distinc-
tions without a difference. Given the relative visibility of the associ-
ated costs, we might have expected that extending this series of
employment subsidies would be politically difficult. It seems on the
contrary to have been remarkably easy. An important part of the
reason is surely that we have agreed to refer to these subsidies as
laws prohibiting "employment discrimination" and advancing the
protected employees' "civil rights."
When a mandatory retirement age or the absence of a wheelchair
5. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1988); see FOR-
BIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 283-312.
6. See Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
7. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976); FORBIDDEN
GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 329-49.
8. See Los Angeles Dep't. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978);
FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note 1, at 313-28.
9. Automobile Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 211 (1991).
10. FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, supra note. 1, at 342.
ramp is described as "employment discrimination" - the term we
still use to describe the refusal to hire on the basis of skin color -
language is being used to disguise, rather than to clarify, the politi-
cal choices being made. The interesting question is why this disin-
genuous strategy has been politically successful. No one who notices
the issue can really equate these new forms of "employment discrim-
ination" with the 1964 kind: people are not that gullible. The wide-
spread popularity of laws against "employment discrimination" more
likely indicates that the political consensus in this country genuinely
favors subsidized employment for certain classes of fellow-citizens
with whom it is easy to sympathize. Even were it described in unvar-
nished terms, such a policy accords well with political views that
clearly are widely held: a conviction that personal fulfillment re-
quires access to the job market; a belief in the dignity of labor; and a
willingness to help those who help themselves." Calling the program
"antidiscrimination" rather than "subsidy" has the useful conse-
quence that it removes the cost from the government budget, so that
to most people it looks free. The linguistic evasion is tactful as well.
No one wants to be told that his job is being subsidized, relative to
the jobs of fellow-workers; the polite way to describe the relationship
is therefore to say that the recipient's civil rights are being protected
against discrimination. Assuming that the end result is really what
most people want, and it may be, the worst thing about the modern
law of "employment discrimination" may be no more than the vio-
lence it does to the language.The book-within-a-book of Forbidden Grounds makes an impres-
sive case that the cost of these subsidies is higher than is generally
appreciated, that the need for them is less, and that if the political
consensus were better informed we would not employ these back-
door techniques to subsidize people's jobs. Such an argument is
intensely controversial: far more so, I would say, than Professor
Epstein's claims about the historical persistence of race discrimina-
tion under market pressure, because it lies so much closer to policy
choices that might reasonably be made differently.
The expansive vitality of "discrimination" as a vehicle for social
reorganization - and the need to explore its unexamined political
premises - seems to me, in retrospect, the real subject of Forbidden
Grounds. The Symposium never got that far. Preoccupied with argu-
ments about race discrimination, we never reached the point of ex-
amining the uses to which the discrimination analogy is now being
put. The protean forms of modern-day "employment discrimination"
11. Considerations of this kind are aptly evoked in Jerry Mashaw's article for the
Symposium. See Jerry L. Mashaw, Against First Principles, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 211,
233-36 (1994).
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probably reflect something of the same embarrassment. Until the na-
tion reaches more substantial agreement on the question we. started
with - what we mean by race discrimination and what we propose
to do about it - it seems likely that most uses of the word "discrim-
ination" will continue to escape rigorous definition.

